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"Lying is not only excusable; it is not only innocent, and
instinctive; it is, above all, necessary and unavoidable ...."
H.L. Mencken'
I. INTRODUCTION
Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the nation's first female B-52 pilot,2 was asked by
Air Force investigators if she had had an adulterous affair with a married man.
Lieutenant Flinn lied. She was afraid "the truth would end her dream of flying
' Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; A.B. Florida State University, 1968;
J.D. University of Florida, 1971. The research of this article was funded by Stetson University College
of Law, and the author is very grateful for that assistance. The author wishes to thank Stetson
Professor Michael Finch for his reading of earlier drafts and Catherine Hudgins for her research
assistance.
IH.L. MENCKEN, PREJUDICES: FOURTH SERIES 15 (1924) quoted in INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF
QUOTATIONS 205 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp & Thomas Y. Crowell eds., 3d ed. 1970).
2 Flinn Wants Honorable Discharge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 20, 1997, at 3A.
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fighter jets."3 But the investigators had other evidence, and so Lieutenant Flinn
was not only charged with adultery by the United States Air Force, but she was also
charged with violating Article 107 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ)4 which is the military analogue to 18 U.S.C. § 100 1
18 U.S.C. § 1001 purports to criminalize false statements made to
government investigators.6 Lieutenant Flinn could have raised as a defense to the
false statement charge, the "exculpatory-no" doctrine! According to this doctrine,8
3Id.
' Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 907, Art. 107 (1994) provides that "[a]ny person
subject to this chapter who, with intent to deceive, signs any false record, return, regulation, order, or
other official document, knowing it to be false, or makes any other false official statement knowing it
to be false, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
5 See Lt. Brent G. Filbert, Article 107, Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice: Not a License to Lie, ARMY
LAW., 1994 - MAR, at 3, 4 ("In Hutchins, the United States Court of Military Appeals (COMA) held
that a 'general analogy' between Article 107 and § 1001 existed .... The COMA also held that the
purpose of both statutes was identical .... The Hutchins decision was important... because it firmly
established the link between Article 107 and § 1001 - a connection still recognized today.").
6 See Jennifer L. Kraft & David A. Sadoff, Ninth Survey of White Collar Crime: False Statements, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 539, 541-544 (1994):
Section 1001 covers all statements, whether oral or written, sworn or unsworn,
voluntary or required by law. Such statements include invoices and certifications,
credit card statements, checks naming false drawees (but not "bad" checks),
applications to obtain official documents, . . . identifications to border agents,
information given to customs agents, Medicare claims, radio distress signals
broadcast to naval aircraft, marriage vows given to gain citizenship, information
given to federal investigators, and a wide variety of statements to other
governmental entities, usually made in attempts to profit under false pretenses.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
' See Filbert, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that COMA has recognized the exculpatory-no defense,
although they have never used it to overrule an Article 107 conviction).
' There is considerable divergence over the exact content of this "doctrine." See United States v.
Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[E]ven among circuits that have adopted it, there is a
considerable divergence concerning its content."). Compare United States v. Becker, 855 F.2d 644,
646 (9th Cir. 1988) (setting out a five-part test which must be satisfied before applying the
"exculpatory-no" limitation: (1) the false statement must not involve a claim against the government;
(2) the declarant must be responsive to inquiries initiated by federal agency; (3) the statement must not
impair a governmental function; (4) the government inquiry must not have constituted a routine
exercise of administrative, as opposed to investigative, responsibility; and (5) a truthful answer would
have incriminated the defendant) with United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1321 (6th Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit test as too broad), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909 (1991).
Even among those Courts of Appeals adopting the Ninth Circuit test, there is a divergence
[Vol. 99:
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"a person may not be prosecuted for making a false exculpatory response to
government investigators." In its most common form, the defense operates when
a defendant simply says no, he did not commit the crime, in response to questioning
by a government investigator. Other courts have extended the defense to immunize
more elaborate, discursive denials of guilt.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the doctrine,
the Court has accepted certiorari on a Second Circuit exculpatory-no case.'0 The
federal circuits are divided on whether the exculpatory-no doctrine is a defense to
as to how liberally or narrowly the elements of the test should be applied. See generally John E. Davis
& Michael K. Forde, Tenth Survey of White Collar Crime: False Statements, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
323, 331, n.38 (Winter 1995) (discussing differences between Fourth Circuit's and Ninth Circuit's
application of five-part test). There is also a divergence of authority between those circuits that permit
an affirmative exculpatory story or statement to qualify as an "exculpatory-no." See, e.g., United States
v. Myers, 878 F.2d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying doctrine to affirmative statements of Secret
Service agents); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 979 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating "exculpatory-no"
doctrine does not extend to misleading exculpatory stories or affirmative statements other than simple
denials); United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding "exculpatory-no" applies
only where the responses to government inquiry are merely "no" without affirmative discursive
falsehood, under circumstances indicating that defendant is both unaware that he is under investigation,
and is not making a claim or seeking employment); See generally Davis & Forde, supra at 331
(discussing other conflicts of circuit authority); Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Statements Fall
Within Exculpatory Denial Exception to Prohibition, Under 18 USCS § 1001, Against Knowingly and
Willfully Making False Statement Which is Material to Matter Within Jurisdiction of Department or
Agency of United States, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 742, 748-49 (1991).
1 U.S. v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The 'exculpatory no' doctrine
provides an exception to [Section] 1001. If certain requirements are met, a person may not be
prosecuted under [Section] 1001 for making a false exculpatory response to government
investigators."); See, e.g., United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 715 (1 1th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he federal
courts have held that in some circumstances false statements exculpatory in nature, though made to a
department or agency of the United States, are not criminalized by [Section] 1001."); See also Wiener,
96 F.3d at 36 ("[T]he doctrine embodies the view that Section 1001 is generally not applicable to false
statements that are essentially exculpatory denials of criminal activity.").
"o See Weiner, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996), 104 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. grantedsub nom. Brogan
v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2430 (1997).
1997]
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a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001." It has been recognized by seven circuits, 2
and the defense has been rejected by two.'3
18 U.S.C. § 1001 contains three clauses that criminalize three kinds of
conduct: concealing a material fact, making a false statement, and using a false
writing. The false statement clause to which the exculpatory-no doctrine is directed
is the second clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. It provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact, or makes any false statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.'
4
In order to convict a defendant under the plain language of 18 U.S.C. §
1001, the government must prove that the accused (1) knowingly and willfully, (2)
made a statement, (3) in relation to a matter within the jurisdiction of a department
or agency of the United States, (4) with knowledge that it was false, fictitious, and
fraudulent."
By the plain language of the statute, the false statement clause would seem
to prohibit any and all false statements. It does not contain an exception for false
" See, e.g., Kraft & Sadoff, supra note 6, at 547 ("The circuits are split on the applicability of section
1001 to exculpatory denials."); See also Sandm L. Turner, Note, Would I lie to You? The Sixth Circuit
Joins the "Exculpatory No" Controversy in United States v. Steele, 81 KY. L.J. 213, 218 (1992/1993)
("Not only is there disagreement as to the appropriate form of the exculpatory no doctrine, but also as
to the proper application of the doctrine. This conflict presents a disturbing inconsistency that
demands clarification."); See also Timothy I. Nicholson, Note, Just Say "No": An analysis of the
"Exculpatory No" Doctrine, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 225, 226 (1991) ("Although a
majority of the federal circuits purport to adopt the doctrine, the supporting rationales are inconsistent.
Consequently, tests for the application of the doctrine likewise vary from circuit to circuit.").
12 See infra notes 16-22.
'3 See infra notes 23-24.
14 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (emphasis added).
"s See Weiner, 96 F.3d at 37.
[Vol. 99:
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denials of guilt. But seven circuit courts of appeal, the First,16 Fourth, 7 Seventh, 8
Eighth, 9 Ninth, 0 Tenth,2' and Eleventh,22 have adopted the exculpatory-no
6 See United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-184 (1st Cir. 1975) (discussing for the first time
in the circuit the exculpatory-no defense, albeit not denominating it as such).
"7 See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with Cogdell's
contention that her conviction under section 1001 of making false statements to the investigating agent
cannot stand. We conclude, applying the 'exculpatory no' doctrine .... "); see also United States v.
Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 978 (4th Cir. 1994) ("This circuit has embraced the 'exculpatory no' doctrine.").
1 See Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473-474 (7th Cir. 1994):
The "exculpatory no" doctrine represents ajudicial gloss on 18 U.S.C. [Section]
1001. A careful examination of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States
dealing with Section 1001 reveals that this concept has not found favor there. In
a very narrow and limited fashion, it has found favor here. It therefore becomes
our obligation to examine this record under the concept of "exculpatory no" which
has evolved in this circuit.
Id. (citations omitted).
'9 See United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1990):
The circuits which have squarely addressed the applicability of the "exculpatory
no" doctrine have concluded that, "under certain circumstances, the government
may not prosecute an individual for false or fraudulent statements which were
made in response to questioning initiated by the government where a truthful
statement would have incriminated the defendant." An examination of these cases
persuades us as well that we should apply the "exculpatory no" doctrine to this
case.
Id. (citations omitted).
20 See United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The 'exculpatory no'
doctrine provides an exception to [Section] 1001 .... In Medina De Perez, combining elements drawn
from Bedore and Rose, we discussed five factors that should be satisfied to apply the 'exculpatory no'
doctrine .... ") (citations omitted).
2 See United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1980) ("We have held, in enunciating
the so-called 'exculpatory-no' doctrine, that essentially negative answers to questions propounded by
investigating government officials are not statements within the meaning of the second clause of
[Section] 1001 in the absence of some affirmative, aggressive, or overt falsehood on the defendant.").
2' See United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 719 (1 th Cir. 1986) ("Here as in Bush and Paternostro,
the agent acting in a police role, aggressively sought a statement from a person under suspicion and
not warned. The answer was essentially an exculpatory 'no' as to possible criminal activity. All of the
bases for the exception to [Section] 1001 apply here.").
1997]
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exception. Two circuits, the Fifth,' and most recently the Second, 4 have rejected
the doctrine based on its departure from the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Supporters of the defense have been concerned that permitting a conviction
for an oral, unsworn statement would be unfair since the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 crime is
punishable with greater severity than that of perjury. They are also concerned that
18 U.S.C. § 1001 swallows up the perjury statute and a plethora of other more
specific federal statutes that proscribe the making of false statements to specific
agencies and activities of government. They have also expressed concern about the
chilling effect aggressive prosecution, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, will have on the
willingness of citizens to come forward and aid federal investigations, where the
most trivial and innocent statement can result in a felony prosecution. These
concerns underlie or supplement the potential legal bases for the defense: (1) the
privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) the statutory history of 18 U.S.C. §
1001.
Some of the circuits have suggested the need for the exculpatory-no
doctrine because the broad application of section 1001 comes "'uncomfortably
close' to infringing on Fifth Amendment rights," although no circuit has directly
based its decision on the Fifth Amendment. Instead, those circuits recognizing the
exculpatory-no defense have done so primarily based on their interpretations of
legislative history.
It will be argued that questioning under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not coerce
a person into incriminating herself because such questioning does not force a person
into a constitutionally forbidden trilemma - confess, lie, or remain silent - and that
such questioning does not constitute coercive state action which violates that
' See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Finding no such reason
to deviate from the plain language of [Section] 1001, we now discard the 'exculpatory no' doctrine in
this circuit.").
24 See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Our flirtation with the 'exculpatory
no' doctrine is over... and we therefore consider whether the doctrine is a defense to Section 1001
liability in this circuit. We hold that it is not.").
25 Compare Rodriguez-Rios, 991 F.2d at 170 (Higginbotham, J. concurring) (rejecting the doctrine
and stating that "[w]e found further justification for the doctrine in a perception that a broad
application of the statute came 'uncomfortably close' to infringing upon Fifth Amendment rights.")
(citing United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974)) (en bane) ivith United States
v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1986) (accepting the doctrine and mentioning the
"'distaste for an application of the statute that is uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amendment') and
United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1988) (accepting the doctrine and stating that
"[c]ourts also have recognized an additional justification for the doctrine as a safeguard against
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person's privilege against self-incrimination. Such a person must make a "choice,"
and that choice will have consequences. But consequences do not equate with
coercion. If telling the truth would incriminate the person, he has the freedom to
remain silent, just like any other witness before a government investigator. He
cannot lie and then seek to avoid the "perjury-like" 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prosecution
by claiming he was coerced into the lie.
This article will also consider whether there is a materiality requirement in
18 U.S.C. § 1001. Courts that have recognized a materiality requirement have
provided a defense to those who have lied to the government in minor or trivial
ways. This article will conclude that recognition of a materiality requirement
contradicts the plain language of the section and improperly resurrects some forms
of the exculpatory-no defense.
The concerns of the supporters of the exculpatory-no defense and a
materiality requirement need not be ignored. In particular, the fear that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 will be used to prosecute minor or trivial lying is already addressed by the
Eighth Amendment independently in so far as it prohibits extreme punishment for
minor misconduct.
II. EXCULPATORY-NO AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is regarded as the privilege
against self-incrimination, provides that "[no person] shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . .. " The key is compulsion.' 7 The
privilege "is not triggered unless there is compulsion to talk .. , " and "this
compulsion must come from the state."e9 Although the text of the Fifth Amendment
"does not delineate the ways in which a person might be made a 'witness against
himself,"' '3
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) ("[A]s Professor Levy concluded in his
history of the privilege, '[t]he element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient or
the right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interrogatories.' W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFT AMENDMENT 328 (1968)").
28 See, e.g. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,397 (1976) ("The Court has held repeatedly that the
Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the
person asserting the privilege.") (citations omitted).
29 See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS, AT § 15.01 (3rd ed. 1993).
0 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990).
1997]
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[The Court has] long held that the privilege does not protect a
suspect from being compelled by the State to produce "real or
physical evidence." Rather, the privilege "protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature." "[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused's communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a
'witness' against himself."'
Although the privilege is clearly involved when the state directly compels
a witness to incriminate himself, it may also be implicated when the government
gives the witness a "Hobson's choice."'32 This "Hobson's choice" can result when
the state "boxes-in" a guilty person, forcing him to confess or lie. As it has been
stated, the privilege against self-incrimination is also "founded on our unwillingness
to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, lying,
or punishable silence." '33
In the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 exculpatory-no situation, is the person who would
incriminate himself by telling the truth placed in this constitutionally prohibited
cruel trilemma? Such a person has three "choices": (1) talk truthfully (risking self-
incrimination), (2) lie, giving an "exculpatory-no" response, which risks 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 prosecution, or (3) refuse to give a statement (perhaps risking use of his
3' Id. (citations omitted).
32 But not all "choices," will constitute "coercion." The fact that the government "gives a defendant
or suspect a 'choice' does not, always resolve the compulsion inquiry. The classic Fifth Amendment
violation - telling a defendant at trial to testify -- does not, under an extreme view, compel the
defendant to incriminate himself. He could submit to self accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury)
or decline to testify (risking contempt). But the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment
prevents the state from forcing the choice of this 'cruel trilemma' on the defendant." See Neville, 459
U.S. at 562- 563 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964)). The Neville court
also noted the proposition that "telling a witness under a grant of legislative immunity to testify or face
contempt sanctions is 'the essence of coerced testimony."' New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459
(1979).
33 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597 ("Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate
an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity,
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silence in cross-examination if he should take the stand in his trial34 on the
underlying offense and testify to a defense which he failed to state to the
investigator).35 But is the defendant in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 trilemma really "boxed
34 [According] to the general rules regarding admissions, the prosecution is generally
permitted in a criminal case to prove that an accusatory statement was made in the
hearing of the defendant and that the defendant's response was such as to justify
the inference that he agreed with or 'adopted' the accusation. Such evidence is
admissible as substantive proof of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged ....
Underlying this theory of admission by failure to deny is the assumption that
human nature is such that innocent persons will deny false accusations.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 160 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 3d ed. 1984) (citing 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1071 (Chadboum rev. 1972)). But there can be constitutional problems with drawing an inference
from a criminal defendant's reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination:
Griffin v. California,... held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits drawing an
inference of guilt from a criminal defendant's reliance upon the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. The next year, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held
that custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers implicated the privilege
and therefore a suspect in that situation had a right to silence protected by the
Fifth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). But Grifin and Miranda do not apply to the usual 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 investigative setting because the witness is not in custody at the time of the interview. See infra
note 45 and accompanying text.
3 The position that
use of evidence to impeach a testifying defendant is less intrusive upon any
interests violated by the obtaining of that evidence than is use of such evidence as
direct proof of guilt, was reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v.
New York that the Fifth Amendment did not bar the use of confessions obtained
in violation of Miranda for such limited purposes. Whether a defendant's post-
arrest silence in the face of accusations could constitutionally be used for
impeachment if the defendant took the stand at trial was addressed in Doyle v.
Ohio. In Doyle, the defendants were charged with sale of marijuana to a police
informer. At trial, they took the stand and testified that the transaction-which was
not clearly observed by officers-was actually a sale by the informer to them. On
cross-examination, the prosecution was permitted to elicit from each defendant
that neither, after being arrested and given the Miranda warnings, told the
arresting officer the version of the events offered at trial. The prosecution did not
urge admission of the defendants' silence as proof of guilt but only as impeaching
the defendants' credibility as witnesses. . . . The Supreme Court held this
constitutional error for two reasons. First, silence after arrest and Miranda
warnings are "insolubly ambiguous." The person has been informed of the right
to silence. If the silence is merely reliance upon that right, it is not, of course,
evidence of consciousness of guilt. Permitting the jury to speculate on the
inference under these circumstances, the Court apparently concluded would be
constitutionally impermissible. Second, implicit in the Miranda warning of the
right to silence is the assurance that silence will carry no penalty. To give an
arrestee such an assurance and then permit use of that silence to impeach an
explanation later offered at trial would be "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation
1997]
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in" as in the traditional trilemma? As we have seen, the only danger to the
defendant in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 trilemma is the use of his silence against him in
the event he takes the stand at his trial. But if the defendant takes the stand at his
trial he will not only be telling the truth, but presumably he will also being telling
a story that is exculpatory, not inculpatory. If so, why did he not tell the story to the
investigator in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 investigation? After all, if it is the truth and
also is exculpatory, then that story would not have incriminated the defendant at the
18 U.S.C. § 1001 investigation; if it could not have incriminated him then, the
trilemma does not apply.
The gravamen of a coercive trilemma is coercion. Again, the issue is, were
the choices coerced? The focus is not on the whether the choice or choices have
consequences, for the "criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to
make difficult choices." '36 As to the coercion factor, the Fifth Circuit considered the
possible application of a "section 1001 trilemma," when it stated:
There is a concern that [section] 1001 forces persons who had
committed a crime to choose between lying and incriminating
themselves. This concern is not entirely correct. In such a
situation, such individuals have the third option of remaining silent
- a choice protected by the Fifth Amendment .... "37
A suspect, like every other witness in a 18 U.S.C. § 1001 situation can
remain silent. The key is that this silence is not forcing him into a trilemma. The
of due process".
McCormick supra note 34, at 426-427 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
But in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 situation, the witness is not in custody or
under arrest, and therefore his silence can be admitted against him. In Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), [the] defend ant, at his state trial for murder,
testified that his killing of the victim was in self-defense. On cross-examination,
the prosecution elicited from him that he had not been apprehended for the offense
until two weeks after the killing and during that time he had in no way raised any
claim of self-defense. Finding no constitutional error, the Court characterized
Doyle as resting upon the proposition that fundamental fairness that prohibits
inducing a suspect to remain silent by implicitly assuring him that silence cannot
be used against him and then using that silence to impeach him. On the facts of
Jenkins, the Court concluded, "no governmental action induced [Jenkins] to
remain silent before arrest," and therefore "the fundamental unfairness present in
Doyle is not present in this case".
Id. (footnotes omitted).
36 Neville, 459 U.S. at 564.
3'. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1050.
[Vol. 99:
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third choice under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is not the type of compulsion suggested in the
traditional trilemma's third prong of silence where the threat of contempt forces the
witness to testify, and thereby incriminates himself by confessing or is thereby
punished by perjury for lying.38
Any witnesses that gives evidence to a government investigator under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 risks the possibility that their testimony or silence could be used
against them. Their choice is simple -- tell the truth or remain silent. But those
choices are hardly coerced. If they are coerced, every statement and every silence
in a government investigation could not be used against a witness at trial as a
confession or impeachment because such statements or silence would be the result
of unconstitutional coercion. The issue is the presence of compulsion, not the
presence of adverse consequences, and in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 situation there is
simply no constitutionally recognized compulsion in the exculpatory-no situation.
For this reason, none of those courts which has recognized the exculpatory-no
defense has grounded its decision on the privilege alone. They believe the
prosecution of "exculpatory-nos" is "close" to offending the Fifth Amendment,39
but is not close enough to produce a constitutional infirmity in the process.
Another factor in determining if a constitutionally prohibited trilemma
exists is whether the government has used the trilemma "subtly [to] coerce[] the
[witness] into choosing the option it had no right to compel."' In Neville, the Court
considered an argument that a D.U.I. defendant was coerced into choosing between
taking a breath test and having his refusal to take the test offered against him at
trial." Justice O'Connor, in writing for the majority, said there was no coercion in
Neville because the State was not subtly trying to use a trilemma to get the
38 Although not directly ruling on whether this 18 U.S.C. § 1001 risk of silence (tacit
admission/impeachment) on cross-examination is the "contempt" equivalent third prong of the
traditional "cruel trilemma," the adverse consequences of remaining silent have been mentioned by one
circuit court See Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1050 n.26 (referring to the silence prong of the trilemma
and stating that "[t]his is not to say that remaining silent is not without its drawbacks. Silence may be
used to impeach one's testimony in court. Silence is an unnatural response from which the questioner
may infer the suspect's guilt.") (citation omitted).
" See United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that the exception is
due in part to the "latent distaste for an application of the statute that is uncomfortably close to the
Fifth Amendment.").
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defendant to refuse the blood-alcohol test so that they could use that refusal against
him in court.4"
Which choice is the government seeking to have the witness make in the
purported 18 U.S.C. § 1001 trilemma? Does it not want his truthful testimony?
After all, it is trying to resolve an investigation. Would not the truthful testimony
of witnesses be helpful in that regard? Or is the government subtly coercing the
witness to lie, so it can prosecute him for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001? The
witness can claim his silence, and there may be penalties for exercising that choice,
just as there were for Neville for refusing the blood-alcohol test. But as Justice
O'Connor stated, a choice may not be "an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to
make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make
difficult choices. 43
Just as there is a concern that the witness in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 situation
should be advised that it is against the law to lie to the investigator, there might be
a concern that the witness should receive Miranda-like warnings about the trilemma
in a 18 U.S.C. § 1001 investigation. But such a witness is not constitutionally
entitled to Miranda warnings.44 Without the witness being in custody or the
functional equivalent of custody, interrogations do not require Miranda warnings,
42 See id. at 563-564.
In contrast to these prohibited choices, the values behind the Fifth Amendment are
not hindered when the state offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-
alcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test
is so safe, painless, and commonplace that respondent concedes, as he must, that
the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the
test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate,
the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of
refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this
a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it
had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary, the
State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication
arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a
refusal to take the test. We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse
to take a blood alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to
make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make
difficult choices.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
41 Id.. at 563.
44 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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and the giving of warnings cannot create a custodial or coercive environment where
none exists.45
If the Court were to find that the exculpatory-no defense is constitutionally
mandated in the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 situation by the self-incrimination privilege of the
Fifth Amendment, then people who are guilty of the offense for which the
investigator is probing get a real windfall by virtue of the effects of such a ruling.
If they confess, their confession cannot be used against them. If they lie, they can
not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. If they remain silent, their silence
cannot be used against them. In those situations, why would anyone tell the truth
or take care to be accurate, when talking to government investigators? Maybe the
Miranda-type warning that should be given in that event by the government
investigator should read:
You have the right to confess, lie, or remain silent, and if you do
confess, lie, or remain silent, your confession, admissions, or
anything law enforcement gets as a result of those confessions or
admissions can not be used against you at a later criminal trial. If
you lie, you can not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which
statute punishes lying to investigators with up to five years in
prison. If you remain silent, your silence in the face of my
accusations cannot be used against you if we ever get enough
admissible evidence to charge you with some crime. If you take
the stand in your trial and tell a different story to the jury then you
tell today, the government cannot ask you at trial why your story
at trial is different than the story you told today. Knowing these
rights, is there any reason you would want to talk to me, and if you
do talk to me, is there any reason I should believe anything you tell
me?
But there is another problem related to the Fifth Amendment argument that
is raised by the exculpatory-no defense. The circuits adopting the defense have not
applied the doctrine to all cases. These circuits have established a prerequisite for
application of the defense by limiting it to situations where government agents act
as "police investigators" as opposed to "administrators." '46 Some circuits have
45 ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARKS. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS,
§§ 9.2-9.2.1 at 260-261 (2d ed. 1996).
46 See United States v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Hence, it is when
government agents are acting as 'police investigators' rather than as 'administrators' that this
prerequisite for invocation of the 'exculpatory no' doctrine is met."); see also id. at 545 n.6; cf United
States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) ("Cases
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established another prerequisite. The Ninth Circuit, in promulgating the
exculpatory-no defense, has devised a "five factors" test47 that "must be satisfied"
before the doctrine can be applied in any particular case. Other Circuits have
adopted the Ninth Circuit test.
48
involving the F.B.I. or U.S. Attorney initiating the questioning have uniformly held the statute not to
cover the responses, although not always by the same rationale") (footnotes omitted); Thevis, 469 F.
Supp. at 513 ("T]he courts with near unanimity have excluded from the statute's sweeping language
unsworn, oral, false exculpatory responses to questions posed by investigative agents"); United v.
Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D. D.C. 1974) (stating that courts have been "troubled by the
application of [section] 1001 to F.B.I. interviews"); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 828 (9th
Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., specially concurring) (holding, in a case in which DEA agents questioned a
pharmacist concerning illegal drug purchases, that Bedore and the "exculpatory-no" exception did not
apply; that the majority's holding rested on the conclusion that the DEA agents were not conducting
a criminal investigation at the time questions were asked, but an administrative determination into
declarant's qualifications for the "privilege" of dispensing drugs). But cf United States v. Mitchell,
397 F. Supp. 166, 174 (D. D.C. 1974) (concluding that a criminal defendant's false statements to F.B.I.
agents are within the scope of [section] 1001). Courts have been divided on the question whether
section 1001 applies during Internal Revenue investigations. Compare United States v. Ratner, 464
F.2d 101, 105 (9th Cir. 1972) ("[The] Ninth Circuit cases hold[ ] answers to Internal Revenue
investigations to be outside the "exculpatory 'no'--police-officer's holdings") and Neely v. United
States, 300 F.2d 67,69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962) (altered lease given to I.R.S. agent)
and Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1960) (declarant gave false responses when
asked whether he had received income from prostitution) with Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d
298, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1962) (police officer lied to IRS about accepting graft money). Courts that have
refused to apply the doctrine to tax fraud investigations may have been influenced by legislative
history. See Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183 n.9 ("Tax Fraud investigations would appear to be closer to
what the statute was intended to cover than are FBI investigations, because underlying any tax inquiry
is the question of monetary loss to the government.").
4" The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, combined the elements drawn
from United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972) and United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir. 1978). US. v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988), set forth the five factors that
should be satisfied to apply the 'exculpatory-no' doctrine:
(1) the false statement must be unrelated to a claim to a privilege or a
claim against the government;
(2) the declarant must be responding to inquiries initiated by a federal
agency or department;
(3) the false statement must not impair the basic functions entrusted by
law to the agency
(4) the government's inquiries must not constitute a routine
exercise of administrative responsibility; and
(5) a truthful answer would have incriminated the declarant.
Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d at 1224.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Medina, listing the five
factors, and evaluating Cogdell's case under the Ninth Circuit's factors); see also United States v.
Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Medina, listing the five factors, and evaluating
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The "five factors" test limits application of the exculpatory-no defense
regarding some false statements made to governmental agencies. The Ninth Circuit
has concluded that the defense is not applicable to false statements "that might
support fraudulent claims against the Government, or that might pervert or corrupt
the authorized functions of those agencies to whom the statements were made. 49
But contrary to the Ninth Circuit's "five factors" test, the Fifth Amendment
trilemma would be just as present for the suspect in the two situations culled out by
the Ninth Circuit as it is in the situations covered by applying their "five factors"
test. If the trilemma exists as it states, does it not exist in the two culled out cases?
And if answering truthfully would incriminate the suspect or witness, the privilege
against self-incrimination would mandate the application of the exculpatory-no
defense in those cases as well.
Although factor five of the Ninth Circuit analysis applies "if a truthful
answer would have incriminated the declarant,"50 a person must satisfy the four
other factors to receive the benefit of the exculpatory-no defense.5 This leaves
persons exposed to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prosecution in the Ninth Circuit who would
otherwise be protected if the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 situation really posed a
constitutionally prohibited coercive trilemma under a Fifth Amendment analysis.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit and those circuits adopting its reasoning are wrong about
the applicability of their doctrine. If the defense is applicable, it is applicable to
every case in which a witness, by answering truthfully, will incriminate himself.
These circuits probably made their mistake about the limited application of the
defense because they only fashioned their theory from their reading of the
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, rather than grounding their rulings in the
Fifth Amendment.
III. EXCULPATORY-NO, STATUTORY EVOLUTION, AND PLAIN MEANING
As indicated previously, the exculpatory-no doctrine has been accepted by
the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 2 These
circuits base their acceptance of the defense primarily on their interpretation of the
Taylor's claim to the defense under the Ninth Circuit's factors).
9 United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972).
o See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
5' See Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d at 1224-1226.
2 See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
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statutory evolution of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 53 The Fifth Circuit, 4 and the Second
Circuit have been the only circuits to reject the defense,55 and they, likewise, base
their rejection of the defense primarily on their reading of the statutory evolution
of 18 U.S.C. § 1001."6 The Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have neither adopted nor
rejected the exculpatory-no defense.57
The circuits adopting the exculpatory-no doctrine, based on their reading
of the statutory evolution of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, state that false denials to criminal
investigators are not the statements Congress intended to prohibit under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Under this interpretation of the evolution of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, there are
only two kinds of false statements sought to be prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1001: (1)
" The exculpatory-no doctrine was first enunciated by Judge Chestnut in the case of United States v.
Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955). In that case,
[a]fter carefully reviewing the legislative history of section 1001, Judge Chestnut
stated that Congress intended the statute to 'protect the government against false
pecuniary claims' and 'to protect governmental agencies from perversion of their
normal functioning....' He therefore concluded that Congress did not intend the
statute to reach false statements that were not volunteered with the intent to induce
government action, but were instead exculpatory responses to questioning initiated
by government agents.
Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 182 (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit relied on the reasoning of Judge
Chestnut in adopting the "exculpatory-no" defense and several other circuits which have adopted the
defense have cited Stark. See Steele, 896 F.2d at 1007:
The genesis of the idea that [section] 1001 should not be applied as written in
certain cases is a trial court opinion emanating from a United States District Court
for the District of Maryland in 1955, US. v. Stark, in which the court held that
certain false negative answers, given under oath to agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, were not 'statements' within the meaning of [section] 1001.
There issued, thereafter, a line of cases from several courts to the general effect
that [section] 1001 will not be applied to false negative answers to official
inquiries when the speaker elects to make the untruthful response because a
truthful answer would be 'incriminating'.
Id. (citations omitted).
5 See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 37 (citing Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962)).
5 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., United States v. Wiener 96 F.3d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing the statutory
language and legislative history of 1001 and concluding "we find no support for [the 'exculpatory-no'
defense] in statutory language or legislative history."). See also United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14
F.3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, finding no
intent on the part of Congress to recognize an "exculpatory-no" defense, and concluding by stating that
"[finding no such reason to deviate from the plain language of [section] 1001, we now discard the
'exculpatory no' doctrine in this circuit").
17 See Weiner, 96 F.3d at 37.
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those related to a claim to a privilege or a claim against the government, and (2)
those that impair or pervert the basic functions entrusted by law to the agency.
Since true exculpatory-no statements do not relate to a claim or privilege, nor do
they impair the basic functions of an agency,58 the argument goes, such statements
are not criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 109. 59 Although there is some variation
in the circuits about which test to use to ferret out an exculpatory-no situation,60 the
" See Patemostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 303-304 (5th Cir. 1962) (citing United States v.
Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (citing United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959)).
While the Special Agent may have been disappointed that defendant would not
truthfully answer himself into a felony conviction, we fail to see that his
investigative function was in any way perverted. The only possible effect of
exculpatory denials however false, received from a suspect such as defendant is
to stimulate the agent to carry out his function.
Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 303-304. See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964).
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modem, that a system of
criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends
on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. As
Dean Wigmore so wisely said: '[a]ny system of administration which permits the
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof
must itself suffer morally thereby....' This Court also has recognized that 'history
amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement
officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence .... '
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal
justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness
on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-490 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). See also United States v.
Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986).
[A] competent government investigator will anticipate that [a] defendant will
make exculpatory statements. A defendant who meets this expectation cannot
possibly pervert the investigator's police function. We presume that a thorough
agent would continue vigorous investigation of all leads until he personally is
satisfied that he has obtained the truth.
Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d at 546. But see United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated, 501 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1974). ("Statements such as that given by appellant and falsely
pointing to possible criminal conduct that is within the power of the FBI to investigate carry a
substantial potential for wasting the Bureau's time and thus perverting its central function.").
S9 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60 See Giles A. Birch, Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the
Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1273, 1283-1284. Birch discusses the different tests:
[t]here are significant differences between the.. .[Ninth Circuit] and the [Fifth
Circuit].... First, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit did not 'see, in the
context of a post-arrest interrogation, any meaningful distinction between an
exculpatory "no, I am not guilty," and a more complete, evasive exculpatory
1997]
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most used test is the five-part test, originally devised by the Ninth CircuitO' The
five factors, all of which must be satisfied to qualify a false statement for
exculpatory-no treatment are (1) the false statement must be unrelated to a claim of
privilege or a claim against the government; (2) the declarant must be responding
to inquiries initiated by a federal agency; (3) the false statement must not impair the
basic functions entrusted by law to the agency;62 (4) the government's inquiries
must not constitute a routine exercise of administrative responsibility; and (5) a
truthful answer would have incriminated the declarant.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 began as a Civil War enactment. It was originally passed
to cover a spate of frauds against the federal government. The original version was
promulgated in 186363 and one clause of that act made it a crime for a member of
the military to make a false claim against the government' A second clause dealt
with statements that supported false claims. 5 In 1873, the statute was codified as
response to a direct question.' Second, because the test is conjunctive, there is no
exculpatory no if the suspect did not fear self-incrimination. Finally, the Ninth
Circuit test has two elements not usually considered in the Fifth Circuit cases:
whether the question was administrative or investigative, and whether a false
answer would impair the agency's function.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing the Fifth Circuit as pro-exculpatory-no because they were so before their
decision in Rodriguez-Rios).
6 Id. ("The Ninth Circuit articulated the most frequently cited test for the exculpatory-no doctrine in
United States v. Medina De Perez....").
62 See supra note 56 and accompanying text, for how the supporters of exculpatory-no assert that
merely answering "no" does not pervert or impair the basic functions of an agency arguing that trained
investigators expect this response from suspects. But what happens if the investigator does not suspect
the witness? Would this still be an expected response? Would this impair the function of the agency
by wasting valuable time and money in pursuit of other leads or new people who, based on the
witnesses, now have become suspects, albeit, wrongly?
63 See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1994) (referring to the Act of
March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863)).
64 Id. Rodriguez-Rios noted that it is a criminal offense for
any person in the land or naval forces of the United States... [to] make or cause
to be made, or present or cause to be presented for payment or approval to or by
any person or officer in the civil or military service of the United States, any claim
upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer
thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent ....
Id.
65 [i]t was illegal for any person in such forces or service who shall, for the purpose
of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of such claim, make,
use, or cause to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, entry, roll,
[Vol. 99:
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Revised Statute § 543 8. Congress amended the statute so it covered "every person"
instead of being limited to military personnel.66 In 1918, Congress amended the
false statement clause of the statute and required a purpose to cheat, swindle or
defraud the government.67 In 1934, the purpose requirement was removed at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, who wanted to use the statute
to enforce section 9(c) of the NIRA.68 The purpose requirement of the 1918 Act had
been interpreted by the court to require that the government suffer pecuniary or
property loss.69 Hence, the purpose requirement of pecuniary gain or property loss,
account, claim, statement, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same
to contain any false or fraudulent statement or entry.
Id.
66 Id. (quoting Act of Dec. 1, 1873, § 5438, 18 Stat. 1054-55).
67 See id, quoting the Act of Oct. 23, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-228, § 35,40 Stat. 1015-16 (1918), which
provided that
whoever, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or
approval ofsuch a claim, or for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and
swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department
thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder,
shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent
statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made any false bill,
receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing
the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry ... shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Id. (emphasis in original).
68 Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1046 n.14 (quoting United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93-94).
Legislation had been sought by the Secretary of the Interior to aid the enforcement of laws
relating to the functions of the Department of the Interior and, in particular, to the
enforcement of regulations under § 9(c) of the [NIRA] .... [A]fter the President objected
to the original legislation, [a]nother measure was then proposed by the Secretary of the
Interior which would obviate these objections and accomplish the purpose of reaching the
presentation of false papers in relation to hot oil. The report of the Judiciary Committee of
the Senate stated that the amendment in question had been proposed by the Department of
the Interior with the purpose of reaching a large number of cases involving the shipment of
hot oil, where false papers are presented in connection therewith.
Id. (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
69 See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 92 (1941) (citing United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339,
346-47 (1926)); see also. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1047 n.15.
A sale of 'hot oil' did not cause such a loss. Any loss would be suffered by other
oil producers, not by the government, as the other oil producers would face a
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as contained in the purpose clause of the 1918 Act, was removed so the statute
could be used to enforce the NIRA. 0
"In United States v. Gilliland,7 the Court rejected the argument that the
predecessor to § 1001 should be restricted to the narrow purpose of the 1934
amendment of aiding in the enforcement of the NIRA."72 The Gilliland Court
stated:
The fact that the Secretary of the Interior was then seeking aid in
the enforcement of § 9(c) of the [NIRA], which this Court later
found to be invalid (Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388)
in no way affects the present application of the statute. Its
provisions were not limited to the enforcement of § 9(c) of the
[NIRA] but were enacted with appropriate breadth so that they at
once applied to the presentation of affidavits, reports, etc., required
by the subsequent Act of February 22, 1935, and the regulations
duly prescribed thereunder.73
Thus, as stated in Rodriguez-Rios, "the Court approached the statute by
looking not at its purpose but at its plain language."74 The Rodriguez-Rios court
also noted that
[A]lthough the Court stated that the purpose of § 1001's
predecessor was to deter perversions of governmental functions,
the Court refused to limit the statute to the "hot oil" rationale, not
because the rationale was an inaccurate characterization of the
statute's purpose, but because such a limitation would conflict with
its text.75
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1047 n.15.
70 Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1047.
71 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
72 Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1047.
73 Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 95.
74 Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1047.
75 Id. at 1047n.17.
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The exculpatory-no doctrine, and particularly factor three of its five-part
test is an attempt to "resurrect" the old purpose requirement that was contained in
the statute prior to 1934. It attempts to do this by seeking to determine if the
statements impair or pervert the basic functions of the agency. 6 But, as stated by
Rodriguez-Rios, it is clear that when Congress wanted to restrict the scope of
statements under § 1001 to those made for certain purposes, it did so explicitly."
"Therefore, even if it were necessary to go beyond the statute's plain meaning, the
'exculpatory-no' exception defies the legislative history of § 1001 "78
The 1934 amendment is critical to the argument over the statutory history
of § 1001. And the court's conclusion about that amendment in United States v.
Gilliland provides the strongest support for the exculpatory-no doctrine, the Ninth
Circuit's five-part test, or at least some narrowing of the scope of § 1001 to
statements that impair or pervert. In Gilliland, the court stated in a phrase, often
quoted by the supporters of the defense:
The statute [the predecessor to § 1001] was made to embrace false
and fraudulent statements or representations where these were
knowingly and willfully used in documents or affidavits "in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States." In this, there was no restriction to cases involving
pecuniary or property loss to the government. The amendment
indicated the congressional intent to protect the authorized
functions of governmental departments and agencies from the
perversion which might result from the deceptive practices
described. We see no reason why this apparent intention should be
frustrated by construction.79
But there is more evidence that Congress is aware of the problems herein
discussed surrounding § 1001 and exculpatory-no and is still satisfied with the plain
language of § 1001. Attempts have been made in that body to address some of the
concerns or justifications for the exculpatory-no defense discussed in this article,
but all of them have failed to pass. Congress, in this regard, considered but failed
to pass the following bills: (1) one requiring the statement in § 1001 to be recorded
76 See id. at 1048 (making a similar argument as to the criteria in Paternostro).
I d. (footnote omitted).
78 Id.
" Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93.
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and made with the declarant's knowledge and another one requiring the government
to advise defendants that lying was a crime,"° and (2) one reducing exculpatory-no
statements to misdemeanors with a maximum penalty of twelve months and
requiring either written statements or corroborating evidence if the statement is
oral."'
Hence, while the exculpatory-no defense may be suggested by some of the
old statutory history of § 1001, the plain language of § 1001 and Supreme Court
precedent trumps that old statutory history.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS AND § 1001
Although there is ajudicial conflict over the breadth and application of the
exculpatory-no defense,82 several consistent policy concerns laid down early on in
80 See Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1048 n.19 (citing Birch, supra note 10, who cited Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1980, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. Section 1742 (1980); Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 1343(a) (1) (A) (1981)).
8, See United States v. Poutre, 646 F.2d 685, 686 n.2 (1980)
As of the date of this opinion, versions of the long-awaited revision of the federal
criminal code have been favorably reported by the judiciary committees of both
houses of Congress (H.R. 6915, S. 1722, 96th Congress., 2d Sess.). Each version
significantly narrows the scope of the existing false statements provision while
grading the offense less severely. The House provision, § 1742, covers only
written or recorded statements, thereby avoiding the dangers associated with the
lack of a reliable transcript. The House bill reduces most false statement offenses
to misdemeanors, punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of twelve
months as compared to five years under existing law, and grades as a class E
felony (eighteen months) false statements made in an investigation by the
Inspector General. The Senate version takes a different approach, covering
unrecorded oral statements but requiring corroborating evidence in such
prosecutions. §§ 1343(a) (1) (A), 1346(b) (4). The Senate bill incorporates the
'exculpatory-no' doctrine as a grading devise, classifying such statements as class
A misdemeanors (twelve months) and all other false statements as class E felonies
(two years).
Id.
82 See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) ("While the breadth of the doctrine
[exculpatory-no] varies from circuit to circuit .. "); United States v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224, 1228
(6th Cir. 1995) ("Although a majority of the circuits have adopted the 'exculpatory-no' doctrine, their
reasoning in applying the doctrine varies greatly."); see also Birch,, supra note 60 at 1273-74:
Even the courts that have adopted the doctrine explicitly, however, have had
difficulty defining it. The existing definitions of the exculpatory no depend on
arbitrary distinctions. Some courts attempt to distinguish between simple denials
and more complex, or "affirmative," falsehoods. Other courts attempt to
distinguish between investigative and administrative inquiries. And even courts
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the jurisprudence of the doctrine underlie the formal justifications for the defense.
First, there is a concern that it is unfair to prosecute someone for an oral, unswom
false statement under § 1001 when an oath and sometimes a writing is required in
perjury prosecutions." Defendants in perjury prosecutions are constructively
informed that, by taking an oath, they are legally obligated to tell the truth, but most
defendants do not know it is against the law to lie to a federal investigator in a
prosecution under § 1001. There is also a concern that, because no writing is
required in the § 1001 situation, law enforcement itself will be encouraged to
fabricate allegedly false testimony, or at least pit the defendant against the
investigator and his report in a contest the defendant cannot hope to win. But the
same argument can be made regarding statutes prohibiting the false report of a
crime.' In those crimes, there is no requirement of an oath and the report is often
that use the same definition of the exculpatory no have reached contradictory
conclusions in cases with similar facts.
Birch, supra. See also Timothy I. Nicholson, Just Say "No": An analysis of the "Exculpatory-no"
Doctrine, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 226 (1991) ("[T]he doctrine consists of a
collection of diverse theories ... rather than a unitary rule. Although a majority of the federal circuits
purport to adopt the doctrine, the supporting rationales are inconsistent. Consequently, tests for the
application of the doctrine likewise vary from circuit to circuit.") (footnotes omitted) (citing 3 K.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 13.19 (Supp. 1989); Robert B. Foster, Jr., White Collar
Crime: A Survey of the Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 169, 273-80 (1980); Comment, False Statements
to United States Customs Officials: The "Exculpatory-no" Defense, 2 CAN. AM. L.J. 133 (1984); Note,
Judicial Reluctance to Enforce the Federal False Statement Statute in Investigatory Situations, 51
FORDHAM L. REv. 515, 517-19 (1982); Note, Constitutionally Privileged False Statements, 22 STAN.
L. REv. 783, 84 (1970).
s See United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-184 (1st Cir.1975).
The defendant here did not initiate anything; he did not even go so far as to
fabricate a misleading story in response to the inquiries. He merely gave negative,
oral responses to the questioning. No oath was given; no transcript taken. The
interviews were informal. Under all these circumstances, we hold that Chevoor's
responses were not "statements" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The
government quite properly did not charge him under that section; instead, they
charged him under a statute carrying with it the safeguards of formality, normally
including a transcript, as well as the average citizen's awareness that lying under
oath is a crime.
Id.
84 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.49 (West 1959), which provides
Whoever willfully imparts, conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed to any
law enforcement officer false information or reports concerning the alleged
commission of any crime under the laws of this state, knowing such information
or report to be false, in that such crime had actually been committed, shall upon
conviction thereof be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.
19971
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made to the police officer in person or over the phone. Furthermore, these same
objections have been raised before Congress and rejected."
A second concern is that the witness in a § 1001 investigation should be
advised or warned that lying is a crime. 6 This is an interesting suggestion. Are we
not presumed to know the law as enacted by Congress? Would the adoption of this
requirement lead to further requirements that no one can be prosecuted for the
commission of a criminal act until he is advised that committing the act is against
the law? Would this prevent the prosecution of income tax invasion unless and
until the taxpayer is warned that tax evasion is a crime? It is also interesting to note
that Congress considered, but failed to enact, a bill that would have required the
government in § 1001 investigations to advise defendants that lying is a crime.
The punishment for false reports of crime, however, is typically less than
that provided for violations of § 1001, which leads to the second concern.
Supporters of the exculpatory-no defense have been concerned that allowing a
§ 1001 conviction for an oral, unsworn statement would be unfair since the § 1001
crime is punishable with greater severity than that of perjury.87 This unfairness
argument, however, was rejected by the court in United States v. Rogers,8" where
the court stated that this marginal disparity had no significance. The matter of
penalties, according to the court, lies within the discretion of Congress, and because
the statutes only provide the maximum permitted punishment, they permit discretion
by the sentencing judges depending on the gravity of the particular violations.89
8 See supra note 80-81 and accompanying text.
86 See Birch, supra note 60, at 1288 ("Mhe statute should be presumed not to apply unless the agent
has warned the suspect that lying is a crime and that silence is permitted.").
87 See Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (1967) (arguing that Congress could not have
"considered it more serious for one to informally volunteer an untrue statement to an F.B.I. agent than
to relate the same story under oath before a court of law"). It should also be noted that the maximum
penalty for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 is $2,000 or five years in prison. The maximum penalty
under § 1001 is $10,000 or five years in prison.
88 466 U.S. at 482 (1984).
89 Id. at 482.
A similar argument was made and rejected in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S.
at 95. The fact that the maximum possible penalty under Section 1001 marginally
exceeds that for perjury provides no indication of the particular penalties, within
the permitted range, that Congress thought appropriate for each of the myriad
violations covered by the statute. Section 1001 covers 'a variety of offenses and
the penalties prescribed were maximum penalties which gave a range for judicial
sentences according to the circumstances and gravity of particular violations'.
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A third concern is that § 1001 swallows up the perjury statute and a
plethora of other federal statutes that proscribe the making of false statements to
specific agencies and activities of govemment 0 In essence, the applicability of the
specific statute trumps the all-encompassing § 1001. This argument was rejected
by the court in United States v. Batchelder,9 however, where the court stated that
it had long recognized that where conduct violates more than one statute, the
government may prosecute under either so long as the choice does not discriminate
against any particular class of defendants.92 Batchelder further made it clear that
this prosecutorial discretion is constitutional. In fact, the court in Batchelder stated
that it is constitutional for a prosecutor to choose to prosecute a defendant under a
felony statute instead of a misdemeanor statute where both statutes proscribe
identical conduct. 93
90 See United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (1972).
If the italicized portion of section 1001 were read literally, virtually any false
statement, sworn or unswom, written or oral, made to a Government employee
could be penalized as a felony. Thus read, section 1001 would swallow up perjury
statutes and a plethora of other federal statutes proscribing the making of false
representations in respect of specific agencies and activities of Government.
Id. (citation omitted).
9' 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
9 Id. at 124 ("This Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute,
the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants.") (citations omitted).
93 Id.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged this 'settled rule' allowing prosecutorial
choice.. Nevertheless, relying on the dissenting opinion in Berra v. United States
... the court distinguished overlapping statutes with identical standards of proof
from provisions that vary in some particular. (citation omitted). In the court's
view, when two statutes prohibit 'exactly the same conduct,' the prosecutor's
'selection of which two penalties to apply' would be 'unfettered.' (citation
omitted). Because such prosecutorial discretion could produce 'unequal justice,'
the court expressed doubt that this form of legislative redundancy was
constitutional. (citation omitted). We find this analysis factually and legally
unsound.
See also id. at n.8 (referring to the case of Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 140 (1956).
Berra involved two tax evasion statutes, which the Court interpreted as proscribing
identical conduct. The defendant, who was charged and convicted under the
felony provision, argued that the jury should have been instructed on the
misdemeanor offense as well. The Court rejected this contention and refused to
consider whether the defendant's sentence was invalid because in excess of the
maximum authorized by the misdemeanor statute. The dissent urged that
permitting the prosecutor to control whether a particular act would be punished
1997]
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A fourth concern is that the specter of a § 1001 prosecution would have a
chilling effect on citizens coming forward with vital information in criminal
investigations.94 This chilling effect was rejected in Rodgers, where the Court
stated the concern was debatable and since § 1001 only applies to one who
knowingly and willfully lies, innocent citizens acting in good faith would not be
deterred from performing their civic responsibilities."
A related concern is that the plain language of § 1001 will criminalize
trivial and innocent statements.96 A similar argument was made in a case involving
an analogous false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1014. But the court rejected that
argument in United States v. Wells.97 In Wells, the court made it clear that it would
strike down prosecutions that sought to criminalize innocent or unremarkable
as a misdemeanor or a felony raised 'serious constitutional questions'.
9' See Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1967).
In reaching this decision we are influenced by the important social policy that is
served by an open line of communication between the general public and law
enforcement agencies. To preserve order, individuals must be given every
encouragement to report suspected crimes to the police. To divert this free flow
of information would allow more crimes to go undetected and criminals free to
commit further depredations. To construe this statute to embrace individuals who
volunteer unsworn information to the police, even though the information is
proved false, we fear would to a degree dry up a prime source of truthful
information. When the specter of criminal prosecution hangs over the head of
every citizen who reports suspected violations, individuals will naturally hesitate,
or even refuse, to provide vital information. They will fear that should their
information appear to be false to the police they may be called upon to defend
themselves in a criminal prosecution. Especially will this be true when the source
of the information is persons of the lower educational and economic strata and
those with criminal backgrounds.
Id.
" United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 4873 (1984) ("But the justification for this concern is
debatable. Section 1001 only applies to those who 'knowingly and willfully' lie to the Government.
It seems likely that 'individuals acting innocently and in good faith, will not be deterred from
voluntarily giving information or making complaints to the F.B.I."') (citations omitted).
' See United States v. Lambert, 470 F.2d 354, 358 (1972) ("It is noted that we are dealing with a very
broad statute. Were it to be applied in every situation consonant with its literal wording any individual
who passed on to a governmental agency the most trivial bit of misinformation would be criminally
liable for his statement.").
97 117 S.Ct. 921 (1997).
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conduct,98 and it cited two examples where the court had done just that. But a
victim of this predicament need not rely only on a discretionary ad hoc
determination by the court. He can rely on the Constitution. The court, in Coker
v. Georgia,99 stated that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment bars not only punishments that are barbaric, but also those that are
excessive or are grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. 00
Hence, the concerns of the supporters of the exculpatory-no defense and a
materiality requirement should not be ignored. However, the fear that § 1001 will
be used to prosecute minor or trivial lying is already addressed by the Eighth
Amendment independently in so far as it prohibits extreme punishment for minor
misconduct.
V. MATERIALITY AND § 1001
The plain language of § 1001 does not limit prosecution under that statute
to only "material" false statements, understanding the word material to mean having
a natural tendency or is capable of influencing the decision of the decision-maker.
If § 1001 did, there would be no need for an exculpatory-no defense, for the phrase
"having a natural tendency or is capable of influencing" is analogous to the
impairment and perversion factor in that defense and would require the government
to show, on an ad hoc basis, how the false statement influenced, or was capable of
influencing, the action of the agency.
But even the circuits that have rejected the exculpatory-no defense have
read a materiality component into the false statement clause of § 1001. And the
United States Supreme Court has assumed there is a materiality requirement in that
I' d. at 931.
Respondents next urge that we follow the reasoning of some Courts of Appeals in
reading materiality into the statute to avoid the improbability that Congress
intended to impose substantial criminal penalties on relatively trivial or innocent
conduct. But we think there is no clear call to take such a course. It is true that
we have held Section 1014 inapplicable to depositing false checks at a bank, in
part because we thought that it would have ma[de] a surprisingly broad range of
unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law, and elsewhere thought it possible
to construe a prohibition narrowly where a loose mens rea requirement would
otherwise have resulted in a surprisingly broad statutory sweep.
Id. (citations omitted).
99 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
1I0 Id. at 592.
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clause.' But if plain meaning prevails in the exculpatory-no situation, how can the
court justify reading a materiality requirement into § 1001 which will resurrect a
piece of the exculpatory-no defense when the plain language of the false statement
clause fails to mention the concept?
Contrary to the plain language of the false statement clause of § 1001, a
majority of the circuits that have adopted the exculpatory-no doctrine consider
materiality an essential element of a § 1001 false statement. 2 Even the Fifth
Circuit, which has rejected exculpatory-no, considers materiality an essential
element of the false statement clause of § 1001,103 and the Second Circuit does too,
albeit because it believes the court has so assumed.'
101 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991) (using the following
language: "[a]lthough materiality remains an essential element of the § 1001 offense "). United States
v. Oren, 893 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Materiality is an essential element of a conviction
for false statements under § 1001."); United States v. Whitaker, 848 F.2d 914,916 (8th Cir. 1988)
("The requirement that the statement or representation be material as well as false is not set forth in the
statute, however it is recognized as a judicially imposed 'essential element' of a charge under §
1001."); United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v.
Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980) ("While materiality is not an explicit requirement
of the second, false statements, clause of § 1001, courts have inferred ajudge-made limitation of
materiality in order to exclude trifles from its coverage.")); United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322,
1326 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Materiality constitutes an essential element of a charge brought under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001."); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 (3rd Cir. 1985) (setting forth that most of the
Courts of Appeals, with the exception of the Second Circuit, have held that materiality is an essential
element of§ 1001.).
"3 See, e.g., United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113, 118 (5th Cir. 1975) ("An essential element of the
offense of making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is that
such a statement relate to a material fact."); United States v. Rodriquez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1048 (5th
Cir. 1994) ("[A]ny violation [of§ 1001] must be material.").
,0 See United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1474 (2d Cir. 1995).
Following briefing in this case .... the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Gaudin. ... which unanimously held that the element of materiality under § 1001
must be determined by the jury and not the court. It is uncontested that conviction
under [§ 1001] requires that the statements be "material" to the government
inquiry, and that "materiality" is an element of the offense that the Government
must prove. Nonetheless, the Court's focus on the constitutional role of the jury
to decide whether the offending statements [in a prosecution under § 10011 are
material is premised on its implicit view that materiality is indeed an element of
the offense.
Id (citations omitted) But the Second Circuit had rejected materiality as a requirement for prosecution
under § 1001 before the Court decided Gaudin. Id.
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The court has dealt with materiality and § 1001 in two recent decisions. 5
In United States v. Gaudin,"'6 the Court dealt with the issue by assuming that
materiality was a requirement of the false statement clause of § 1001 because the
parties agreed that materiality was an element of § 1001 1°7 The court again dealt
with the issue in United States v. Wells.' In Wells, however, the court was dealing
with whether the false statement clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 contained a materiality
requirement." 9
As set forth in Wells, Congress has enacted at least 100 false statement
statutes."0 Forty-two of them "contain an express materiality requirement, while
fifty-four do not.""' In writing for the court in an 8-1 decision, Justice Souter
began his analysis by establishing an interpretive framework for determining
whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014 contains a materiality element."' He first examined the
text and concluded that materiality under this, the first criterion of his interpretive
hierarchy, would not be an element of § 1014."' The same applies to § 1001.
10s See Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506; United States v. Wells, 117 S.Ct. 921 (1997).
106 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
'07 Wells, 117 S.Ct. at 924 ("While the appeal was pending, we decided United States v. Gaudin,..
. in which the parties agreed that materiality was an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 ...."). See also
Johnson v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548 (1997) (establishing the possible predicate for finding
materiality is not required by the plain language of § 1001 as shown by the following language:
"[a]lthough we merely assumed in Gaudin that materiality is an element of making a false statement
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and although we recently held that materiality is not an element of making
a false statement to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 .... ") (citations omitted).
"0s 117 S.Ct. at 921 (1997).
109 See id. at 926 ("We... consider whether materiality of falsehood is an element under § 1014,
understanding the term in question to mean 'ha[ving] a natural tendency to influence, or [being]
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed...
(quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)).
11' Id. at 934 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[Ait least 100 federal false statement statutes may be found in
the United States Code.").
... Id. (referring to Judge Kozinski's opinion in United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 959-960, nn.3-4
(9th Cir. 1994) in which Judge Kozinski catalogued these statutes in his dissenting opinion).
112 See Wells, 117 S.Ct. at 926-931.
"1 See id. at 926-927 ("We begin with the text... Nowhere does it further say that a material fact
must be the subject of the false statement or so much as mention materiality .... Thus, under the first
criterion in the interpretive hierarchy, [based on] a natural reading of the full text, ... materiality would
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Nowhere does the term "material" or "materiality" appear in the second clause, the
false statement clause of § 1001.
Next, Justice Souter sought to determine if there was a showing that at
common law the term "false statement" acquired any "implication of materiality
that came with it into § 1014.. '. 4 Finding none,"5 he proceeded to the next criterion
of his interpretive analysis. Section 1001, a false statement statute, as opposed to
a perjury statute, likewise has no roots in the common law.
The next criterion is statutory history. Justice Souter perused the
codifications and recodifications of § 1014 and concluded that Congress
deliberately dropped the term materiality and intended that materiality not be an
element of § 1014.116 In the statutory evolution of § 1014 materiality was
continuously written in and out of the various codifications and still Justice Souter
derived no support for the contention that materiality was an essential element of
§ 1014. In the evolution of§ 1001, the word "material" or "materiality" was never
drafted into the false statement clause of that statute.
Justice Souter then addressed two more arguments advanced by Justice
Stevens in his dissent in Wells. Justice Stevens argued that the rule of lenity
supported a materiality element in § 1014. The rule of lenity provides that an
ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of a defendant."7 But Justice
Souter summarily dismissed this argument because for the rule to apply, there must
be "'no more than a guess as to what Congress intended,"' and he found no
ambiguity in § 1014. " 8
not be an element of § 1014.").
114 Id. at 927-928.
Nor have respondents come close to showing that at common law the term "false
statement" acquired any implication of materiality that came with it into § 1014.
We do, of course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-law meaning
of the terms it uses if those terms... have accumulated settled meaning under
... the common law and the statute [does not] otherwise dictat[e].
Id. (citations omitted).
.. Justice Souter concludes this point by stating that "[r]espondents here, however, make no claims
about the settled meaning of 'false statement' at common law; they merelynptwthat some common-law
crimes involving false statements, such as perjury, required proof of materiality. But Congress did not
codify the crime of perjury or comparable common-law crimes in § 1014 .... Id at 927.
126 Wells, 117 S.Ct. at 928 ("Statutory history confirms the natural reading.").
.. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
"8 Wells, 117 S.Ct. at 931.
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Justice Souter also addressed the argument urged by the dissent in Wells to
adopt the reasoning of some of the courts of appeals that materiality should be read
into § 1014 because Congress could not have intended to impose such severe
penalties on relatively trivial or innocent conduct.1 9 But Justice Souter also
rejected this argument. First, he said that there was no need to read materiality into
§ 1014, and he gave two examples where the court had struck down prosecutions
under statutes that "made a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a
violation of federal law.
120
Second, Justice Souter said the plain language of § 1014 would avoid the
severity or triviality problem. He explained:
[A]n unqualified reading of § 1014 poses no risk of criminalizing
so much conduct as to suggest that Congress meant something
short of the straightforward reading. The language makes a false
statement to one of the enumerated financial institutions a crime
only if the speaker knows the falsity of what he says and intends it
to influence the institution.1
2'
But there is another more fundamental reason to reject this argument. As
indicated previously, a victim of the dissent's predicament can rely on the
Constitution. In this regard, the court in Coker v. Georgia122 stated that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bars not only
punishments that are barbaric, but also those that are excessive or are grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime."
119 Id.
120 Id.
We think there is no clear call to take such a course. It is true we have held §
1014 inapplicable to depositing false checks at a bank, in part because we thought
that it would have 'ma[d]e a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a
violation of federal law,' Williams v. United States, 102 S.Ct. at 3093 (1982), and
elsewhere thought it possible to construe a prohibition narrowly where a loose
mens rea requirement would otherwise have resulted in a surprisingly broad




12 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
123 Id. at 592.
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But § 1014's false statement clause is different than § 1001's. Section 1014
criminalizes "'knowingly mak[ing] any false statement .. . for the purpose of
influencing in any way the action' of an FDIC insured bank ....""' " Although
§ 1014 does not contain a materiality requirement per se, requiring the false
statement to have a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing a
decision maker,"2 it does have a "purpose" clause, which in effect does the same
thing that a materiality clause does.'26 But § 1001 has neither a materiality
requirement nor a § 1014 purposes clause. Should that deficiency require that
courts read a materiality requirement into § 1001? No, for two reasons.
First, the majority in Wells cited other false statement statutes that have no
materiality requirement.'27 Although some of these statutes do contain a § 1014
purposes requirement,' others contain no such clause.'29 If the court were to now
read in materiality as an essential requirement for those "no material, no purpose"
false statement statutes, the court would be flooded with habeas petitions.
Second, materiality is not required in all statutes. Requiring materiality in
a statute focuses on the consequences of a defendant's conduct, or the nexus
between the defendant's act and the consequences caused. But statutes drawn
without a materiality element, presumably like those fifty-four mentioned in Wells,
focus on the character of the defendant's conduct, including the intent behind that
conduct. As stated in a case cited by Justice Souter in Wells, statutes can be drawn
either way. 30
224 Wells, 117 S.Ct. at 926.
225 See id. at 926 (setting forth Justice Souter's understanding of the definition of materiality in the
false statement provision of § 1014).
226 See id. at 931 ("Hence the literal reading of the statute will not normally take the scope of § 1014
beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would impose.").
127 Wells, 117 S.Ct. at 934.
128 Id. n.8.
129 Id.
131 See Unites States v. Staniforth, 971 F.2d 1355, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992):
The word 'material' does not appear in section 1014 and, as an original matter,
one might have supposed that the omission was deliberate. Section 1014 is a
criminal statute and many criminal statutes place greater emphasis on the character
of the defendant's act (including the intent behind it) than on the consequences.
On the assumption that the omission of the word 'material' from the statute was
deliberate, all that would be required of the government was proof that the
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VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps it would have been better if Congress had drafted some form of
exculpatory-no or materiality into § 1001. But that is obviously not its current
intent. Congress has been tinkering with § 1001 since the Civil War. It has
considered amendments to exclude exculpatory-no, reduce the punishment, and
require Miranda-like warnings. It could have drafted materiality into the statute,
but it has not.
If, however, following the court's rejection of exculpatory-no and
materiality, prosecutors start to file charges based on innocent or inconsequential
statements, then Congress can act; but there is no evidence of that today. In circuits
where the exculpatory-no defense is not recognized, § 1001 has not been abused.
If that changes, the court has demonstrated that it will not hesitate to strike down
those prosecutions that seek to punish innocent or inconsequential conduct.
Besides, the Eighth Amendment will stop that conduct dead in its tracks.
The court should not do what Congress has decided not to do. Exculpatory-
no is an amorphous and confusing doctrine without legal basis that sends the wrong
message to the citizenry by saying it is okay to lie to the government. Why not send
the right message? If you cannot tell the truth, do not say anything at all.
Citizens should tell government investigators the truth. It saves time. It
saves money. And it is the right thing to do, no matter what H.L. Mencken says.
defendant intended to influence the bank....
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